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The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention
and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine,
and a Partial Solution
MATTHEW BELLINGER*
INTRODUCTION
When the United Nations (UN) was formed, one of its most
important goals was to render war obsolete. The UN Charter states as a
goal the hope to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."I
When President Franklin D. Roosevelt first described his vision for a
post-World War II international organization, he envisioned an
organization that would promote and facilitate "international
cooperation . . . to consider and deal with the problem of world
relations."2 He also wanted a council that would "concern itself with
peaceful settlement of international disputes."3 The UN Charter itself
took the then-unprecedented step of outlawing war, stating that "all
Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means,"
and that "all Members shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."4
However, the UN Charter does not address the important potential
exception of humanitarian intervention. This lack of clarity has led to a
robust debate that continues to this day-can a state legitimately use
* Matthew Bellinger is a 2020 JD Candidate at Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
He is a participant in the Inmate Legal Assistance Program and the Community Legal
Clinic, as well as serving as a Managing Editor for the Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies. He would like to thank his family for their love and support throughout his law
school career.
1. U.N. Charter pmbl.
2. ROGER DANIELS, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE WAR YEARS, 1939-1945 407 (2016)
(quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement of the President on the Postwar Security
Organization Program on June 15, 1994, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 179 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
3. Id. (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement of the President on the Postwar
Security Organization Program on June 15, 1994, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 179 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
4. U.N. Charter art. 2, T 3-4.
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force for humanitarian purposes? Today, many countries have embraced
the "responsibility to protect" doctrine, which allows countries to
intervene in a humanitarian crisis if five criteria are met.
5 One is that
of reasonable prospects which asks, is "there a reasonable chance of the
military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, and
are the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the
consequences of inaction?"*6 Unfortunately, this level of scrutiny needs
to be revised; instead, it should be more rigorous to account for world
leaders' consistent inability to estimate the effects of their intervention.
Additionally, cultural disruption should be considered as one of the
negative effects in this balancing test to address concerns about the use
of humanitarian intervention as a pretext for colonialism.
In this article, I intend to offer a potential solution to address these
concerns. In Part I, I will examine the development of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention and its transformation into the
Responsibility to Protect. In Part II, I will discuss two of the potential
problems with the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The first problem
is countries using humanitarian excuses as a pretext to advance
national aims. The second problem is countries not accurately assessing
the consequences of intervention. In Part III, I will discuss my potential
solution to address these problems - heightening the balance of
consequences test. This will be used to determine whether
humanitarian intervention should be attempted and requiring countries
to consider the desires and culture of the country that is the object of
the intervention before intervening.
PART I: THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DOCTRINE
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The United Nations Charter seems to forbid intervention in the
domestic affairs of other states. The Charter states that nothing in its
contents "shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,"
7 but
the Genocide Convention of 1948 quickly created an agreed upon
exception.8 The Convention states that "[a]ny Contracting Party may
call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such
action . . . as they consider appropriate for the prevention and
5. Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 24
WIS. INT'L L.J. 703, 709-10 (2006).
6. Id. at 711.
7. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
8. Evans, supra note 5, at 705.
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suppression of acts of genocide."9 However, none of the Charter nations
acted on the Convention during the Cold War. Gareth Evans, in a piece
in the Wisconsin Law Journal, argues that the large number of states
joining the UN during the Cold War discouraged humanitarian
intervention. States saw the norm of non-intervention as one of the few
protections against more powerful international actors.10 Indeed, the
general consensus in the twentieth century was that unilateral
humanitarian intervention was illegal. The UN Charter doesn't exempt
humanitarian intervention from the prohibition against the use of force,
and the International Court of Justice ruled in Nicaragua v. United
States that custom doesn't permit unilateral humanitarian
intervention.11
This status quo changed with the end of the Cold War, as a new era
of cooperation between new world powers emerged. Countries began to
intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries.12 One particular
example is the American-led intervention when Iraq invaded Kuwait. 13
In his address to the American people, President George H.W. Bush
explained his decision to intervene in terms of humanitarian
intervention. Bush said that Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, had invaded
a "helpless neighbor," and "crushed" and "brutalized" that neighbor's
people.14 "Our objectives are clear," the President continued, "the
government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and Kuwait
will once again be free."1 5
President H.W. Bush later used even more explicit humanitarian
reasoning to justify an intervention in Somalia. At the time, a "coalition
of warlords" had overthrown the dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre.1 6 When
two warlords started to fight between themselves, the conflict destroyed
the country's agriculture and resulted in nationwide famine.17 The
United Nations eventually sent in peacekeeping forces, and President
H.W. Bush supplemented the UN's peacekeepers with American
9. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. VIII,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
10. Evans, supra note 5, at 705.
11. Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 107, 111 (2006).
12. See Evans, supra note 5, at 706.
13. Persian Gulf War, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNIcA, https://www.britannica.com
/event/Persian-Gulf-War (last updated Mar. 7, 2019).
14. Persian Gulf Air War Begins, C-SPAN (Jan. 16, 1991), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?15723-1/president-bush-announces-beginning-persian-gulf-air-war.
15. Id.
16. Somalia Intervention, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
event/Somalia-intervention (last updated Oct. 11, 2016).
17. Id.
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forces.1 8 In his address to the American people, Bush described the
United States' actions as "a mission that can ease suffering and save
lives."19 According to Bush, the purpose of the United States'
involvement was to allow food to reach starving Somali citizens, nothing
more and nothing less. 20
The United States was not the only country to intervene in struggles
for humanitarian purposes. When a conflict between ethnic Albanians
and Serbs broke out in Yugoslavia, the police, paramilitary forces, and
the Yugoslavian army retaliated with violence.
2 1 Several Western
powers, including the United States and Great Britain, "demanded a
cease-fire, . . . the return of refugees, and unlimited access for
international monitors."2 2 When these demands were not met, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) "began air strikes against
Serbian military targets," until Yugoslavia agreed to the return of
displaced ethnic Albanians.2 3 Together, the American intervention in
Somalia and NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia indicated to many
commentators that an "exception to the [use of force] . . . [was] gaining
acceptance."24
Despite the increased use of humanitarian intervention, a fierce
debate still raged over when a "right to intervene" should trump
national sovereignty.25 The Independent International Commission on
Kosovo recommended that the UN adopt a "principled framework for
humanitarian intervention which could be used to guide future
responses to imminent humanitarian catastrophes."
26 The UN's
Secretary General eventually delegated the task to the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.27 The Commission
"invent[ed] a new way of talking about humanitarian intervention," as
18. Id.




20. Michael Wines, Mission to Somalia; Bush Declares Goal in Somalia to 'Save
Thousands', N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/
world/mission-to-somalia-bush-declares-goal-in-somalia-to-save-thousands.html.
21. Kosovo Conflict, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
event/Kosovo-conflict (last updated Feb. 25, 2019).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Goodman, supra note 11, at 112.
25. Evans, supra note 5, at 706 (quoting Bernard Kouchner, Establish a Right to
Intervene Against War, Oppression, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 1999, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/a-xpm-1999-oct-18-me-23681-story.html).
26. Id. at 707 (quoting INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT:
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 10 (2000)).
27. Id.
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well as clearly and specifically stated when humanitarian intervention
was appropriate.28 According to the Commission, humanitarian
intervention was a responsibility, not a right-all countries had a
responsibility to protect their own citizens.29 If a country failed in that
duty, it might become the responsibility of another country or countries
to step in.30 To determine when a humanitarian intervention was
appropriate, the Commission developed a five-factor test for countries.3 1
First, countries should consider the factor of just cause, which looks at
whether there is "irreparable harm occurring to human beings."3 2
Second, they should consider intent, and whether "the primary purpose
of the proposed military action [is] to halt or avert human suffering."3 3
Third, countries should weigh whether "every non-military option ...
[has] been explored."34 Fourth, intervening countries must also make
sure to use proportional means.3 5 Fifth, the intervening countries must
determine the balance of consequences, which weighs the "reasonable
chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in
question, and are the consequences of action not likely to be worse than
the consequences of inaction?"36
Many situations have triggered the Responsibility to Protect since it
was created. From December 2007 to February 2008, a wave of ethnic
violence swept Kenya due to a disputed presidential election, causing
more than 1,000 deaths and driving 500,000 civilians from their
homes.37 The violence moved the French European and Foreign Affairs
Minister to call for the United Nations to act under the Responsibility to
Protect.38 Eventually, the United Nations brokered a diplomatic
solution to the crisis-a solution that was hailed as "a model of
diplomatic action under the Responsibility to Protect."39 A similar
situation arose in C6te d'Ivoire, as violence broke out when the
28. Id. at 708-11.
29. Id. at 708.
30. Id. at 709.




35. Id. at 711.
36. Id.
37. The Crisis in Kenya, INT'L COALITION FOR RESP. TO PROTECT,
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-kenya [https://web.archive.org
/web/2019 072 3151842/http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-kenya]
(last visited Sept.18, 2019).
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting The Response of International Actors: An Example of 'The
Responsibility to Protect, Human Rights Watch (Mar. 2008), https://www.hrw.org
/reports/2008/kenyaO308/10.htm).
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"incumbent [president] . . . refused to honor the election results that
declared [his opponent] the winner."40 This time, however, the UN
opted for military intervention, declaring in a statement that the
Responsibility to Protect included the prevention of mass atrocity
crimes and informing the public of the potential for genocide and
humanitarian crimes.4 1 The United Nations Security Council first
permitted a military intervention citing the Responsibility to Protect in
Libya.42 In response to civilian attacks by the ruling regime, the
Security Council adopted a resolution directly asserting the
Responsibility to Protect.43 The Council imposed a series of
international sanctions, citing the Libyan government's "responsibility
to protect its population."44 Thus, the Responsibility to Protect has
become an important part of the conversation surrounding international
politics today. Humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to
Protect have important potential for good. However, there are serious
concerns about whether this doctrine can be abused.
PART II. SELF INTEREST AND ACCURATELY PREDICTING
THE OUTCOME OF INTERVENTION
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine undoubtedly has noble
intentions and is arguably a necessary doctrine. As Former Secretary
General Kofi Annan stated, "I believe we must embrace the
[R]esponsibility to [P]rotect, and, when necessary, we must act on it."
45
However, the doctrine raises two particular concerns. First, Western
countries in particular have an unfortunate history of using
humanitarian pretexts for more self-centered purposes.
4 6 Second,
intervenors have often done a poor job of predicting the outcome of
40. The Crisis in C6te d'Ivoire, INT'L COALITION FOR RESP. TO PROTECT,
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/Crisis-in-ivory-coast
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190723151829/httpJ/www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index
.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast] (last visited Sept.18, 2019).
41. Id.
42. Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect, OUTREACH PROGRAMME
ON RWANDA GENOCIDE & UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/
preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtmL (https//web.archive.org/web/20190
208025422/https://www.un.orglen/preventgenocidelrwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml
(last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 1970, at 2 (Feb. 26, 2011)).
45. Evans, supra note 5, at 714 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom:
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, T 135, delivered to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005)).
46. Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the
Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV- 259, 267 (2004).
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intervening in a foreign country.47 The practice of using humanitarian
intervention to advance a state's own interest has a long and
ugly history.48
The United States has often used the language of humanitarianism
to justify its colonial ambitions. 49 When the United States intervened in
Cuba's war for independence, many congressmen "used inflammatory
rhetoric to describe injustices committed against Cuban women by the
Spanish in order to promote military intervention in Cuba's war," while
others "reported of Cuban women who 'were doomed to a grinding
struggle for existence."'50 One particular speech by Senator Redfield
Proctor proved influential in swaying public opinion, and it made heavy
use of humanitarian language.5 1 Proctor claimed that Cuba was in a
state of "desolation and distress, misery and starvation."52 He also
described how the Cuban people had been "driven into these fortified
towns . . . [that were] virtual[] prison yards," and left to "subsist as they
can."53 Similarly, during the United States' 1899 campaign in the
Philippines, propaganda portrayed Filipina women as victims of
"barbaric Filipinos" who were "ineffective heads of households."5 4
Americans believe they introduced civilization to the Filipino
population.55 Many missionaries were excited to convert the Filipino
population to Christianity and felt that abandoning the islands'
population would be sacrilegious.5 6 When the United States invaded
Haiti, American propaganda depicted Haitians in a paternalistic
manner and portrayed the invasion as "necessary to govern unruly
Haitian women."5 7 Thus, mixed with the racist rhetoric used to justify
imperialism, American leaders also held the paternalistic view that they
were undertaking military expansion for the good of the people whose
countries they occupied.58
47. Id. at 294.
48. Id. at 267-73.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 268-69 (quoting Frederic M. Noa, The Condition of Women in Cuba,
OUTLOOK, 1911, at 643).
51. Speech by Senator Redfield Proctor (R-VT) on the Floor of the U.S. Senate on March
17, 1898 (After a Visit to Cuba), HISTORY ON NET, https://www.history
onthenet.com/authentichistory/1898-1913/4-imperialism/2-saw/1-
prelude/ProctorSpeech.html (last updated July 12, 2012).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Weissman, supra note 46, at 269.
55. Id.
56. Mark D. Van Ells, Assuming the White Man's Burden: The Seizure of the
Philippines, 1898-1902, 43 PHIL. STUD. 607, 613 (1995).
57. Weissman, supra note 46, at 270.
58. See id. at 273-78.
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Of course, these benevolent justifications for American intervention
were often far from the truth. The United States' decision to intervene
in Haiti was partially motivated by concern over a loss of the country's
investment, as the United States had loaned a significant amount of
money to the impoverished country.5 9 The United States also wanted to
secure the area around the newly built Panama Canal.6 0 Secretary of
State Elihu Root expressed that with the development of the Panama
Canal, the United States was pressured to monitor and secure the
area.6 1 The United States also had a great deal of self-interested
reasons to intervene in Cuba.62 As Theodore Roosevelt candidly
admitted in his autobiography, "[o]ur own direct interests were great,
because of the Cuban tobacco and sugar, and especially because of
Cuba's relation to the projected [Panama] canal."
6 The United States
also had strategic reasons to occupy the Philippines.
64 "Imperialists,
such as Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Albert Beveridge" wanted to
keep the Philippines, not to help the natives, but rather to make "the
United States a European-style world power complete with overseas
territories."6 5
The United States was not, of course, the only country to use the
rhetoric of humanitarianism to justify colonial expansion. European
countries frequently used humanitarian language to justify their
colonial expansion.6 6 The British partially explained their rule in India
by claiming they were trying to "outlaw . . . practices . . . [such as]
female infanticide, forced marriages, and sati."
6 7 A common theme of
colonial rhetoric consisted of European countries claiming they had not
only a right, but a duty to spread Western civilization to what
Europeans considered less advanced races.
6 8 This belief in European




62. See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 197
(Stephen Brennan ed., Skyhorse Publ'g 2011) (1913).
63. Id.
64. See Van Ells, supra note 56, at 613.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Weissman, supra note 46, at 268 (providing an example of colonial powers
justifying their colonization as preventing sexual assault).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Rutledge M. Dennis, Social Darwinism, Scientific Racism, and the
Metaphysics of Race, 64 J. NEGRO EDUC. 243, 245 (1995) (describing the views of two racist
Social Darwinists who saw colonialism as "important for bringing civilization to the
unenlightened"); Matthew G. Stanard, Interwar Pro-Empire Propaganda nd European
Colonial Culture: Toward a Comparative Research Agenda, 44 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 27, 35
(2009) (depicting native exhibits as uncivilized and savage to justify imperialism).
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superiority arose as a result of popular interpretation of Charles
Darwin's work-"Social Darwinism."6 9 The most famous example is
Rudyard Kipling's poem 'The White Man's Burden," where the British
poet exhorts his fellow white men to "bind your sons to exile / To serve
your [captor's] need," in order to bring said captors "toward the light."7 0
Hitler frequently utilized humanitarian language during his pre-
World War II expansion.7 1 For example, during the invasion of Austria,
he appealed to Germans' right to self-determination.72 Hitler wrote a
letter to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that consists of
language strikingly similar to modern humanitarian language.7 3 Hitler
stated that Germans were mistreated and abused, resulting in the
displacement of over 120,000 refugees.74 Hitler's real motivations, of
course, did not match these altruistic statements.7 5 The use of
humanitarian pretexts is not only a bygone problem of the twentieth
century; countries in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries
routinely cited humanitarian reasons to justify their interventions in
foreign countries.7 6 Although the George W. Bush Administration
claimed the invasion of Iraq was justified by Saddam Hussein's
"possession . . . of weapons of mass destruction" and links with
terrorists, the administration also used humanitarian language to
justify the occupation.7 7 When President Bush discussed the "axis of
evil" (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) in his State of the Union address in
2002, he said that America must "defend[] liberty and justice because
69. See Walter A. McDougall, 20th-Century International Relations, ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/20th-century-international-relations-
2085155 (last updated June 18, 2019).
70. RUDYARD KIPLING, The White Man's Burden, in THE FIVE NATIONs 79, 81 (Methuen
& Co. 1903) (1903).




75. See BRIGITTE HAMANN, HITLER'S VIENNA: A PORTRAIT OF THE TYRANT AS A YOUNG
MAN 107 (Tauris Parke Paperbacks 2010) (1999) (describing Hitler's previous desire to
incorporate Austrian Germans into a greater German Empire).
76. See, e.g., Nicholas Kulish, NATO Says It's Prepared to Keep Peace in Kosovo, N.Y.
TIMEs (Dec. 9, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/worldleurope /09kosovo.html
(stating NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999 to "end the violence that claimed as many as
10,000 ethnic Albanians"). See generally Alan J. Kuperman, Obama's Libya Debacle: How
a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure, 94 FOREIGN AFF. 66 (2015) (describing
Obama's initial intervention in Libya as an effort aimed at protecting peaceful supporters
of democracy).
77. Iraq War, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.comlevent/Iraq-
War (last updated Nov. 28, 2018). See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat.1498 (addressing Iraq's
mistreatment of its citizens).
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they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere
[emphasis added]."78 When President Bush announced the start of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, he said the United States' only goals were to
remove a threat and "restore control of that country to its own
people."79 In reality, the invasion of Iraq was part of the United States'
global war on terror.8 0 This invasion was primarily to rid Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction because of the country's association with
terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda.81 Some more skeptical observers have
also suggested that the United States stood to benefit economically by
having direct control over Iraq's oil fields.
8 2
An additional potential problem with humanitarian intervention is
well-intentioned world leaders severely miscalculating the results of
intervention. One excellent example is the American intervention in
Somalia in 1992.83 American leaders were optimistic that intervention
would yield positive results without an overly extensive commitment by
the United States.8 4 The operation, known as the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF), was initially intended to be a "strictly humanitarian and
short-term operation" that was "[o]riginally intended to last only six
weeks" and supposed to pave the way for a takeover by UN
peacekeeping forces in short order.85 After the Battle of Mogadishu,
President Clinton assured the American people that "if we stay a short
while longer, and do the right things, we've got a reasonable chance" of
restoring order and allowing other nations to take America's place.
8 6
Clinton also promised that he would complete the withdrawal of
American forces soon. 87
78. Hurst Hannum, Bellum Americanum, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 29, 32 (2003)
(quoting Office of the Press Sec'y, President Delivers State of the Union Address, WHITE
HOUSE (Jan. 29, 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/01/200201
2 9 -11.html).
79. Bush Announces War on Iraq, C-SPAN (Mar. 19, 2003), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?c4523378/bush-announces-war-iraq.
80. See generally JASON G. RALPH, AMERICA's WAR ON TERROR: THE STATE OF THE 9/11
EXCEPTION FROM BUSH TO OBAMA (2013> (discussing military and legal aspects of the
U.S.'s actions against terrorist organizations)-
81. Iraq War, supra note 77.
82. Tom Rockmore, Can War Transform Iraq into a Democracy?, 103 THEORIA 15, 17
(2004).
83. See generally JAMES DOBBINS ET. AL., AMERICA'S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING: FROM
GERMANY TO IRAQ 55-70 (2003) (describing the T.S's unsuccessful intervention in Somalia
and providing several reasons for the intervention's ultimate failure).
84. DAVID A. LAKE, THE STATEBUILDER'S DILEMMA: ON THE LIMITS OF FOREIGN
INTERVENTION 163 (2016).
85. Id.
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Optimistic American expectations proved to be far from reality.
Initially, the humanitarian mission was a success, and the United
States began drawing down its forces for a UN takeover.8 8 But the
extremist activity of Somalia's then-leader Mohamed Aidid necessitated
a recommitment of U.S. forces, as President Clinton ordered the U.S.
Army Rangers deployed to help hunt down Aidid. 8 9 The search for Aidid
culminated in the "ill-fated raid" of Aidid's Mogadishu residence.90 In
response, the United States was forced to mobilize additional forces, and
President Clinton ordered 1,700 additional troops to Somalia.91 Not
only did the operation require more time and resources than the U.S.
government had hoped, the operation did not end positively for
Somalia's people.92 The disastrous attempt at central government had
convinced Somalia's citizens to turn to the traditional clans for
protection and basic needs, leaving the state fractured.93 The protection
payments made to the warlords by the UN and U.S. forces simply
solidified their power.94 Ultimately, intervention did not have a
significantly positive effect. As one observer noted, "[flor all the
extraordinary amounts of financial and diplomatic resources expended
by [the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM)], its
legacy is surprisingly small."9 5 The United States and UN had thus
badly miscalculated the effects of intervention.
Somalia is hardly the only example of a disastrous miscalculation on
the part of an intervening nation. The Iraq War is another dramatic
example of the United States miscalculating the humanitarian effects
its occupation of the country could have. Although the main focus of the
war was removing a regime with supposed links to Al-Qaeda, the
United States made it clear that it had another goal in mind.96
President Bush said that "[aJ liberated Iraq can show the power of
88. LAKE, supra note 84, at 165-
89. Id. at 169.
90. Id.
91. U.N. Intervention in Somalia, supra note 86.
92. See Debora Valentina Malito, Neutral in Favour of Whom? The UN Intervention in
Somalia and the Somaliland Peace Process, 24 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 280, 297 (2017)
(arguing that UN intervention hindered the peace process by becoming an "instrument of
division").
93. LAKE, supra note 84, at 171-72.
94. Id. at 172.
95. John Prendergast, When the Troops Go Home: Somalia After the Intervention, 22
REV. AFR. POL. EcoN. 268, 268 (1995).
96. See generally Richard W. Soudriette, What Iraq's Elections Teach Us About
Democracy Building, 32 HuM. RTS. 22 (2005) (describing efforts by the United States
government and non-governmental organizations to institute voting in Iraq).
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freedom to transform that vital region."97 In a speech to the United
Nations, Bush laid out a hopeful vision for a democratic Iraq, saying the
Iraqi people could shake off captivity and "join a democratic
Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout
the Muslim world."98 The United States government certainly did not
expect the Iraq War to become the protracted, messy affair it is today.
The attempts to turn Iraq into a democracy have had mixed results.
Iraq is having elections, but only at tremendous costs9 9 to the United
States. 100 Furthermore, "the elections may have exacerbated ... [Iraq's]
sectarian divide."1 01
Additionally, American intervention may have made the country
less safe, both for American forces and native Iraqis.10 2 In 2005, the
CIA's internal think tank, the National Intelligence Council, determined
that Iraq had become a preeminent training ground for a new
generation of terrorists, attracting international terrorists.
103 Warfare
with the United States gave terrorists a chance to "learn[] how
explosives are made, how to identify sympathizers with their cause, the
utility of the internet, and weak points in the U.S. military."10
4 This
new knowledge and an increased terrorist presence would make life less
safe for the people the United States was supposedly trying to help.
97. Office of Press Sec'y, President Discusses the Future of Iraq, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 26,
2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2 0 0 3/02 /2 0 0 302 2 6 -
11.html [https://web.archive.org/web/2019062502521 1/https://georgewbush-whitehouse
.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/
200302 2 6-1 1html].
98. Jeremy Pressman, Power Without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign
Policy Failure in the Middle East, 33 INT'L SECURITY 149, 154 (2009).
99. See U.S. CBO Estimates $2.4 Trillion Long-Term War Costs, REUTERS (Oct. 24,
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GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2005, 10:35 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2005/dec/16/iraq.jonathansteele; Guide to Iraq's Election, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13,
2005, 4:14 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2[hi/middleeast/4522060.stm. See generally CONG.
RESEARCH SERVS., IRAQ: POST SADDAM NATIONAL ELECTIONS (2005) (authored by Kenneth
Katzman, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs) (providing overview of elections held in
2005).
101. Pressman, supra note 98, at 160.
102. See Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence, IRAQ BODY COUNT,
https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (estimating the total
amount of civilian casualties in Iraq since the intervention began); Iraq Fatalities,
ICASUALTIES, http://icasualties.org/ApplFatalities (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (listing
coalition casualties in Iraq).
103. Pressman, supra note 98, at 158.
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The American intervention in Iraq continues to have adverse effects
on the Iraqi people in the long term. 105 The current menace that is the
Islamic State had its origins in the chaos of occupied Iraq.10 6 The
Islamic State of Iraq "originated as one of many Sunni insurgent forces
operating" in the wake of the American invasion.1 07 The Sunnis, who
had "ultimately lost" their long-standing political control, "came to form
the core of an insurgency" in the invasion's resultant power void. 108
Political groups like the Islamic State took advantage of Sunni
"dispossession to mobilize large portions of the Sunni population"
against the new government. 109 The Islamic State, or Al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI), emerged as "the most capable and ruthless militant group
operating in Iraq."11 0 Their leader, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, directed a
"bloody campaign" through tactics like "attacks on military,
government, and tribal leaders who worked with coalition forces," and
through using "high-profile spectacular attacks."111 As a result, the AQI
could "graft[] . . . [itselfJ to the rising Sunni insurgency" and thus the
chaos of U.S. occupation buoyed the Islamic State's rise. 112 Thus, there
are at least two serious problems with the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: (1) the use of
humanitarianism as pretext and (2) the persistent failure to correctly
predict the consequences of intervention for the area's inhabitants.
PART III: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: MODIFYING THE BALANCE
OF CONSEQUENCES STANDARD
A possible solution to the above two problems is a modification to
the test used to determine when a humanitarian military intervention
is appropriate. The current "balance of consequences" standard states
that the effect of the intervening country's action must be "not likely to
be worse than the consequences of inaction."1 13 This standard ought to
be modified in two important ways. First, countries should only
intervene if they are certain that the consequences of action are likely to
be better than the consequences of inaction. This modification would
105. See, e.g. PATRICK B. JOHNSTON ET. AL., FOUNDATIONS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE:
MANAGEMENT, MONEY, AND TERROR IN IRAQ, 2005-2010 (2016) (describing the link
between the rise of the Islamic State and U.S. intervention).
106. See id. at 11.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 13.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 15.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Evans, supra note 5, at 711.
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create a margin of error when a state is determining whether to
intervene abroad for humanitarian reasons. Further, states would be
encouraged to listen to contrarian voices suggesting that intervention
would adversely affect the people it intended to help. Second,
intervening countries should have to consider what the people of the
intervened country desire and listen to the voices suggesting that
intervention would be unwise. In many cases of intervention gone awry,
such as the Iraq War, public figures suggested that intervention would
be a poor idea from the outset.1 14 Former President Bill Clinton warned
about the possible adverse effects of an invasion.1 1 5 Clinton stated that
"a preemptive action today, however well-justified, may come back with
unwelcome consequences in the future" and that "innocent people will
die."1 16 Clinton was not the only prominent American warning that an
intervention in Iraq might not have positive consequences. Senator Jim
Webb warned in a report that everyone who was supporting the war
was aware that there was no plan set for intervention withdrawal.117
Eric Shinseki, the top general of the U.S. Army at the time, warned that
the remaining occupation after the war must be powerful enough to
protect from potential conflicts due to sectarian controversies.118 This
force, as Shinseki suggested, needed to be large to be effective, requiring
hundreds of thousands of soldiers.1 19 The Foreign Minister of France-
United States ally-warned that "military intervention would be the
worst solution."12 0 The Minister warned about the difficulty of having
"a united Iraq" and wondered "[w]hat frustrations and feelings of
114. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE VATICAN; Pope Voices
Opposition, His Strongest, to Iraq War, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 14, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/14/world/threats-responses-vatican-pope-voices-
opposition-his-strongest-iraq-war.html; Kate Connolly, I Am Not Convinced, Fischer Tells
Rumsfeld, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2003, 12:01 AM), https://www.telegraph
.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/1421634/I-am-not-convinced-Fischer-tells-
Rumsfeld-html; Jarrett Murphy, Mandela Slams Bush on Iraq, CBS NEWS (Jan. 30, 2003
1:34 PM), https://www.cbsnews.comlnews/mandela-slams-bush-on-iraq/.
115. House Passes Resolution Authorizing Use of Force in Iraq; New Jersey Supreme
Court Hears Argument for, Against New Democrat on Ballot, CNN (Oct. 2, 2002, 4:00 PM),
http://transcripts.cnn-com/TRANSCRIPTS/0210/02/ip.00.html.
116. Id.
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NEWS (Dec. 7, 2007, 11:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2007/
12/07/winning-over-the-senate-with-frank-words-and-a-keen-mind.
118. John Althouse, Army Chief- Force to Occupy Iraq Massive, U.S.A. TODAY (Feb. 25,
2003, 2-25 PM), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/worldliraq/2003-02-25-iraq-
us x.htm.
119. Id.
120. France's Position on Iraq: Press Conference of Foreign Affairs Minister Dominique
de Villepin (Excerpts), EMBAssY FR. U.S. (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.ambafrance-
us.org/newsistatmnts/2003vilepinOl2003.asp[https://web.archive.
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injustice would be fuelled."1 21 The United States might have given
these objections more weight and ultimately decided not to occupy Iraq,
if it had to consider the standard proposed above.
Iraq is not the only instance of intervention where greater
attention to objecting voices might have staved off disaster-Somalia is
another such instance. When President George H.W. Bush initially
committed U.S. troops to Iraq, the commitment seemed quite rushed. 122
George H.W. Bush "propose[d] to the United Nations that American
combat troops be sent to Somalia to protect aid workers" as his
administration came to a close.123 The initial intervention had a very
short timetable, as troops began arriving in December 1992.124
Additionally, both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations
were so dominated by Colin Powell's doctrine of "overwhelming force
and limited objectives" that arguably "no other vision . . . [for Somalia]
could be enunciated."12 5 In his announcement of U.S. operations in
Somalia, President Bush stated that he consulted with "advisors, with
world leaders, and the Congressional leadership."126 While Bush
certainly made an effort to discuss the situation with people outside the
Administration, he could have consulted more widely. Bush might have
obtained a more complete picture of the situation had he consulted with
experts from independent hink tanks or native Somali citizens who had
recent experience of the conditions on the ground. A higher standard,
requiring a country to be sure its actions would have a positive effect
before intervening, might have encouraged such consultation. Instead,
the United States committed troops with a plan ill-suited to the actual
situation in Somalia.
A counterexample to this phenomenon is actually a previous
military action carried out by the first Bush Administration: the first
Persian Gulf War. The War stemmed from Iraq's intervention in
Kuwait, "with the apparent aim of acquiring that nation's large oil
121. Id.
122. See CIA Whites Out Controversial Estimate on Iraq Weapons; Main Subject of
Today's Senate Intelligence Report Remains Largely Secret; Agency Censors Document
Despite Public CIA Speeches, Testimony, Statements, GEORGE WASH. U. (July 9, 2004),
https:/web.archive.org/web/20090623070452/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NS
AEBB129/index.htm. The CIA's first report of Iraq containing Weapons of Mass
Destruction was delivered in October of 2002. Id. The U.S.-led coalition invasion of Iraq
was launched on March 19, 2003, some five months later. Operation Iraqi Freedom,
GLOBAL SECURITY, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi-freedom.htm (last
updated Mar. 22, 2016, 8:13:30 PM).
123. Somalia Intervention, supra note 16.
124. Id.
125. Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian
Intervention, 75 FOREIGNAFF. 70, 75 (1996).
126. December 4, 1992: Address on Somalia, supra note 19.
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reserves."1 27 On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council
"authorized the use of force against Iraq if it did not withdraw from
Kuwait by January 15, 1991," thus giving coalition forces more time to
prepare and Iraq time to back down and withdraw.128 Rather than
acting unilaterally, the elder Bush worked with countries throughout
the world, including the Soviet Union, to craft the resolution
condemning Iraq.129 When forming a coalition to take military action,
Bush made "economic, political, and military promises to many other
countries."13 0 This careful, consensus-building approach produced quick
and decisive results. The Allied forces began their invasion on February
24, 1991 and by February 28, Iraq's Republican Guard was essentially
defeated and the "Iraqi resistance had completely collapsed."
131 The
resulting peace brokered by the coalition mandated "that Iraq recognize
Kuwait's sovereignty," thus fulfilling the coalition's humanitarian
goals.132 A careful approach seeking consensus yielded a positive
outcome. A heightened standard for determining the balance of
consequences might encourage states to take a more cautious approach
to determine a strategy to optimize relatively positive results, like the
First Persian Gulf War.
The major problem of humanitarianism as pretext is that the
intervening country is putting its own interests ahead of those of the
country that it is supposedly helping. Unfortunately, preventing a
country from using humanitarian intervention to pursue its own ends
will be difficult to do-a country can always be dishonest about its true
intentions. However, the balance of consequences test should be altered
to require an intervening country to consider what the people of the
intervened-in country being intervened hold as "good." In particular,
intervenors should consider goals such as maintaining a country's
cultural integrity in the balance of consequences rationale. This way,
even if a country is motivated by selfish purposes, it will at least be
constrained by forced focus on the native country's desires and
preferences.
One of the common characteristics of the use of pretext is the
intervenor's refusal to consider the desires and culture of the
intervened-in country's residents. When the United States decided to
occupy the Philippines, the "wishes of the [Filipinos] . . . were seldom
considered;" instead, Americans projected their own racist viewpoints
127. Persian Gulf War, supra note 13.
128. Id.
129. See KATHLYN GAY & MARTIN GAY, PERSIAN GULF WAR 23-24 (1996).
130. Id.
131. Persian Gulf War, supra note 13.
132. Id.
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onto Filipinos.13 3 The United States showed no desire to respect or
maintain Filipino culture, and instead eagerly sought an opportunity to
impose its own cultural norms on the country.13 4 Many Filipinos were
Roman Catholic, as the islands had been under Catholic Spain's
control.135 The predominantly Protestant United States was eager to
introduce Christianity to these Catholics.1 36 Not only were Americans
eager to change Filipino culture, they went far beyond humanitarian
actions and worked to deprive Filipinos of their autonomy, refusing to
grant them suffrage or citizenship.13 7 Needless to say, a humanitarian
intervention that results in the intervening country treating the
members of the intervened-in country like children should not be
deemed a success. Had a modified balance of consequences test existed
at the time, the United States would have been forced to take Filipino
culture and values seriously-and essentially finally treating Filipinos
as adults.
The United States was not the only country that failed to consider a
country's native culture to be worth preserving. Colonial ventures,
despite their humanitarian claims, consistently failed to respect their
subjects' cultures, and indeed, saw it as a right and duty to eradicate
those cultures. 138 One prominent example is Britain's determination to
eradicate practices such as veiling and polygamy in India.139 Again, if
the British had been forced to consider the preservation of local cultures
and customs as part of a balance of consequences test, the cultural
destruction that occurred in India (and other colonies) might have been
entirely different. Since many countries in the colonial age were driven
by a belief that they had a divine right to spread Western culture
throughout the world,14 0 requiring a concern for local culture in the
133. Van Ells, supra note 56, at 613.
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balance of consequences test might have sapped colonialism of its
driving force.
A failure to appreciate the culture and desires of native people also
characterized the United States' 2003 occupation of Iraq.141 President
Bush was determined to bring democracy to Iraq, which proved to be
insensitive to the deep cultural divisions that pervaded Iraq.142 The
United States attempted to establish "an Iraqi interim governing
council comprised of . . . [thirteen] Shias, [five] Kurds, [five] Sunni
Arabs, [one] Assyrian Christian, and [one Turkman]."1 43 The divisions
in Iraq immediately asserted themselves, as the council was "unable to
agree on a single leader," and "proved unable to exercise ... [its] limited
duties . . . including drafting a constitution."144 The United States also
proved aggressive in purging Saddam's Ba'athist party.1
45 The De-
Ba'athification of Iraqi Society Order "excluded the top four levels of the
party membership"-about one percent of Ba'athists-"from public
employment."1 46 Additionally, the Order "stated that the top three
layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated
corporation, and government institution would be reviewed for possible
connections to the Ba'ath party."14 7 Full members of the party were
forced to resign from their government-related posts. 148
It is understandable, of course, that the United States wanted to
keep the followers of Iraq's former dictator away from the levers of
power. However, the United States failed to consider that providing the
(arguing that church and state only grew close on the frontier due to shared beliefs and
mutual self-interest).
141. See, e.g., Adeed Dawisha, The Unraveling of Iraq: Ethnosectarian Preferences and
State Performance in Historical Perspective, 62 MIDDLE EAST J. 219, 221-22 (2008)
(showing how the Coalition Provisional Authority failed to understand the need to balance
"ethnosectarianism ... with a national project").
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GEORGE W. BUSH 121 (2008).
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"Kurdish minority . . . an increased role in the political process,"
essentially allowed for the marginalization and frustration of Iraq's
Sunnis.14 9 Needless to say, it is never good when one portion of the
population exercises control over another, as Hussein's Sunni followers
were doing to the Shia Muslims in Iraq.15 0 However, the United States
failed to give proper attention to the delicate political situation in Iraq,
and its decisions served to alienate and radicalize Sunni Iraqis.151
Indeed, the United States seemed more intent on punishing Sunnis for
violating American values than creating a situation where Iraqis could
enjoy any sort of peace. The United States might have been forced to
implement a more workable political solution in Iraq had it been forced
to consider the wishes of Iraqi people and view preserving traditional
culture and political arrangements as something that, preferably, ought
to be maintained.
It is difficult to envision a way to prevent countries from considering
their own interests when they are deciding whether to launch a
humanitarian intervention. The
Responsibility to Protect doctrine could be modified so that
countries must also consider the desires of the country in which they are
intervening. If countries are mandated to consider these desires, they
can be forced to respect the interests of the intervened-in country, even
when pursuing their own interests, as the international community can
hold them accountable. When countries fail to respect the culture and
wishes of the intervened-in country, the international community can
hold them accountable. Furthermore, the difficulty of balancing selfish
interests with the desires of the native country may make countries less
likely to intervene if they are not motivated by a genuine desire to
provide help.
PART IV. CONCLUSION
The U.N. Charter's prohibition against the use of force is well
reasoned. Even when countries undertake military actions with the best
of intentions, many factors will cause these actions to go wrong.
Intervenors can enter another country with a profound
misunderstanding of the current political situation or the realistic
149. JOHNSTON, supra note 105, at 13.
150. See Zack Beauchamp, The Conflict Between Iraqi Sunnis and Shias Sustains ISIS,
VOX (Nov. 17, 2015, 10:25 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/17995846/the-conflict-
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difficulty of an intervention. Whatever happens, many people will likely
die at the hands of military action, and many or most of the deceased
are likely to be citizens of the country the intervenor is supposedly
trying to help. Furthermore, many countries avoid honesty when
claiming to launch military actions for humanitarian purposes-an easy
way to garner goodwill from one's own populace, as well as from the
international community. Thus, many countries appeal under the guise
of humanitarian principles when the true intents are selfish pursuits.
The proposed solution-requiring a balancing test-will not solve all
the problems stemming from the doctrines of humanitarian intervention
and the Responsibility to Protect, but it will temper or improve these
reoccurring issues. No country will ever perfectly predict how difficult a
humanitarian operation will be or the intervention's eventual results.
Furthermore, it is impossible to know for certain whether a country is
motivated by self-interest, with little likelihood that the leaders will
volunteer the information when prompted.
Although we can only divine a country's true purpose, the
international community can hold countries accountable if no
consideration is given for the desires and culture of the people of the
intervened-in country. A heightened balance of consequences test may
encourage countries to engage in a more careful decision-making
process and plan the intervention more thoroughly. This may cause
some countries to decide against undertaking an ill-conceived
intervention.
Humanitarian interventions are ultimately necessary in the modern
world. It is intolerable to suggest that other countries should be
prevented from stopping atrocities such as the Rwandan Genocide
1 52
and the actions by Pol Pot in Cambodia.153 However, humanitarian
intervention must be closely regulated, or more harm than good will
come to the countries in need of such intervention. My suggested
modifications for the balance of consequences test would help regulate
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, hopefully allowing the
doctrine to make the world safer and more just, as it was intended to do.
152. See generally TIM ANDERSON, RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2009) (detailing the events of
the Rwandan genocide of 1994).
153. See generally BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND GENOCIDE IN
CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79 (3d ed. 2008) (detailing the events of the
Cambodian genocide).
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